A War of Mass Distraction

The Senate Armed Services Committee recently heard frank testimony from several of America’s top generals about a war against Iraq. What they had to say demonstrated insights that are absent from our politicians and foreign policy analysts, many who are hell-bent for leather to rush us into a headlong conflict with Iraq.

Georges Clemenceau said that war was too important to be left to the generals. Perhaps that was a statement reflective of his times. But, it is not so in our own time. We should pay attention to what our generals are telling us. For, today’s generals possess a world-view and a grasp of the long run that their peers from earlier eras perhaps did not hold in common, or else were not allowed to air for fear of offending the politicians. The viewpoint of modern military executives is one borne of education and experience on a globalizing planet. And, they have unfettered access to the media like no others before them. In fact, two of those testifying to the Senate Armed Services Committee are military analytical consultants to two major television news services.

In the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on September 23rd, 2002, the generals called into question a war against Iraq.  Committee senators heard testimony from General Joseph P. Hoar, former Commandant of the Marine Corps and the successor to Norman Schwartzkopf as Commander-in-Chief, Central Command. Also testifying were Army General Wesley Clark, former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (and now a CNN consultant), Air Force Lieutenant General Thomas McInerny, a Fox news consultant, and Army General John Shalikashvili, former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and former Chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General Clark cut to the chase and said that Iraq is a distraction from terrorism. Lt. Gen. McInerny, the most hawkish of the generals, said that Saddam Hussein could supply terrorists with weapons of mass destruction. But, that it was not clear that he would do so, and it is not clear that he would like to relinquish control of weapons of mass destruction to a terrorist group. He pointed out that there was no precedent of a nation-state doing that. But, he added, it does rather paint the picture of the U.S. not being attacked by ICBMs, but by Ryder trucks. In such a scenario, Saddam Hussein might be involved, but his fingerprints would not be on the weapon. However, he told the committee, while we have to be mindful of this concern, Al-Qaeda is our top priority.

General Hoar said that the war against terrorism could not be won by overthrowing Saddam Hussein. He told the committee that terrorism was caused by anger over U.S. policies, by our support for Israel over the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people, by our support for repressive regimes in the Muslim world, and by the fact that the US is seen as acting unilaterally in our own interests using Islamic countries, then abandoning them. We cannot end terrorism on our own. It is only the winning of the hearts and minds of the Islamic world that can drive a stake through the heart of Al-Qaeda so that it never rises again. Conversely, continuing to act unilaterally will only exacerbate the problem of terrorism.

General Wesley Clark told the committee that we needed to defuse the perception that the U.S. acts unilaterally. He pointed out that fifty years ago, Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry Truman understood that the US could not act unilaterally. And, this was at a time when the US accounted for fifty percent of the world economy. We could not act unilaterally then, and now, when we only account for a quarter of the world’s output, we can’t afford to act unilaterally.

General Hoar said that integrated intelligence and police work throughout the world, including the Muslim world, are essential to winning the global war on terrorism. He reminded the committee that there are 80 or 90 countries that strongly disagree with the way the U.S. conducts its foreign policy. And, the leaders of those countries have to accommodate their constituents to one extent or another, even in authoritarian regimes. 

General Hoar brought up a practical military consideration about attacking Iraq: we cannot expect Saddam to make the same mistakes during the Gulf War. For example, he will not attempt to engage U.S. forces again in the open desert where we would show such overwhelming technological superiority that his forces could be destroyed in detail. General Hoar’s “nightmare scenario” of what might happen are to have six Republican Guard divisions and six heavy infantry divisions supported by artillery defending Baghdad. In such a situation, an American assault on Baghdad would result in thousands of Iraqi and U.S. combat casualties, as well as thousands of civilian casualties. He said that there is no doubt that we would prevail, but asked the senators, “At what cost?” He ticked off answers to his own question: costs to be determined in American lives and costs in terms of the American image as bombs and shells fell on civilian neighborhoods in Baghdad resulting in civilian casualties and shown on television screens throughout the world.

Hoar talked about other collateral damage, too: economic damage to the United States. He stated that a second Iraqi war would cost between $100-200 billion dollars. Furthermore, the war would cause a spike in oil prices that would weaken the American economy, an economy that is still trying to recover from a recession. Terrorism is a tactic, not an ideology, he told the senators.

General Clark expressed the practical concern that, without Saudi permission to overfly their territory and base troops on their soil, a war against Iraq would be a logistical problem that would increase exponentially.

Senator Ted Kennedy of the committee asked whether the Republican Guard would resort to urban guerrilla warfare? Lt. Gen. McInerny didn’t directly answer the question, but he did point out that Saddam Hussein hasn’t been letting the Republican Guard operate in Baghdad. General McInerny said that it is clear that Saddam Hussein questions certain elements in the Republican Guard. So far, he has arrested 85 Republican Guard officers, so he has a problem there, the general said.

General Hoar opened with questions about the long run considerations of a war against Iraq: who will build post-war institutions in Iraq; is the US willing to commit long-term to this project?

General Clark added that if we were so concerned with going after nation-states with ties to terrorism, why not go after Iran? That country has more links to terrorism than Iraq. He asked the senators to consider this: if we were to attack Iraq, what would be Iran’s response? The answer is not clear, he said. In any case, overthrowing the Baath party in Iraq could create a more intractable problem. He laid out several outcomes. We might see a secular police state replaced by a radical Muslim republic that would be just as inimical to the United States. It is not clear that Iraq would hold together as a single state since its borders were drawn by imperial Western powers at the end of the First World War. And, in that sense, it is an artificial state. A post-Saddam Iraq might see competition between the Sunni, Shi’a, and Wahabi factions of Islam, as well as a struggle by the Kurds in the North for autonomy, and perhaps independence.

General Shalikashvili said the U.S. civilian leadership needs to take the lead in directing the building of civil institutions in a post-war Iraq, including providing for security and police functions. The US military is not properly the entity to do this. General Clark agreed and said that this is a job that can’t be dumped on the United Nations, either.

Gen. Shalikashvili said that the political cost of going into Iraq depends on how successful we are in establishing a stable post-war Iraq. (There would probably be a lot of initial anger in the Muslim world, but over time if Iraq emerged more prosperous and more democratic, that initial anger toward the US would dissipate.)

General Hoar said that we need a war termination plan. We did not have one in 1991. And, that is why we are contemplating going back into Iraq today. Before we go into Iraq again, we need to answer the question: “What does the dog do after it catches the car?”

General Clark made the observation that winning the peace is twice as difficult as winning the war.

General McInerny said “When Rome is strong, the provinces are quiet” meaning that going into Iraq would show American resolve. However, he said, that it would be essential to the effectiveness of our efforts in Iraq to have a strong information operations (IO) program in place there. This would help bring down Saddam Hussein’s regime. There are very few people in Iraq who want to die for Saddam Hussein, and an IO program could very strongly leverage this, he said.

One of the committee senators quoted that war always has a political objective, citing Clausewitz. But, what was the objective? Does the United States want to reinstitute weapons of mass destruction inspections or a regime change, to remove Saddam Hussein from power?

General Hoar said there is no evidence that Saddam has a nuclear capability that has been weaponized and is deployable. General Clark said, because of this, we have time for diplomacy. He told the senators that there is no reason to act precipitously and go into Iraq immediately.

The insights shown by the testimony of several of America’s top generals are manifold. Among them are:

• Terrorism is our target, and it is not an ideological adjunct to Islam or to any political party. It is a deliberate process that could have heavy collateral damage to ourselves and others if we do not respond appropriately or if we get sidetracked from the target.

• We must stop acting unilaterally in the Middle East. The United States has acted unilaterally in its policies in the Middle East, by our support for Israel over the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people, by our support for repressive regimes in the Muslim world, and by the fact that the U.S. has been viewed as acting unilaterally in our own interests, using Islamic countries, then abandoning them. We cannot end terrorism on our own. Whether or not we go into Iraq, we must have the support of other countries, and specifically that of Muslim countries.

• Saddam Hussein is not going to make the same mistakes of military engagement as he did in the Gulf War.

• There is no evidence that Saddam has a nuclear capability that has been weaponized and is deployable.

• We have time for diplomacy.

• Whether or not we go into Iraq, we must not abandon it. If we go in, we must consider rebuilding its post-war institutions; and in any case, we must mount a campaign of information operations.

• We must consider the long-term view for the United States and for Iraq and the Middle East if we attack Iraq.

• If we go in, we must go in with a war termination plan.

Essentially, what our top generals are telling us is that we cannot win a war against terrorism with a war of mass distraction.