The Delaware Plan
The Delaware Plan |
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The Delaware Plan was developed by Delaware Republican Committee member Richard A. Forsten and state chairman Basil Battaglia (Center for Governmental Studies 2001, 18; Klett 2003). Under the Delaware Plan, the states would be grouped into four “pods” according to population, as determined by the decennial census. The smallest 12 states, plus federal territories, would go first, followed by the next smallest 13 states, then the 13 medium-sized states, and finally the 12 largest states. These four consolidated primaries would occur on the first Tuesday of each month, beginning in March and ending in June. In its original form, the Delaware Plan divided the states into five groups based on their populations. However, the Brock Commission had concerns about whether the first grouping of states adequately reflected the voice of minority voters, and whether the nomination would already be decided by the time the last group of states held their primaries. To alleviate these concerns, the Commission proposed that the states be divided into only four groups instead of five, and recommended that the U.S. territories (American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands) and the District of Columbia be specifically included in the first group of states, in order to strengthen the voice of minority voters early in the process. The plan was rejected by the RNC Rules Committee at the July 2000 Republican Convention in Philadelphia due to opposition from the Bush campaign and from large-population states. (Walsh 2000, Lester 2000) Table 13 and Figure 28 show a possible schedule for 2004. Figure 29 and Figure 30 are corresponding political and geographic maps.
The plan delays costly, high stakes campaigns in large states until later in the season, with the intent of allowing a wide field of candidates to run inexpensive campaigns in small states in early contests. In recommending the plan, the report of the Brock Commission stated:
The party would achieve its goal of reducing front-loading through this plan's limitation on the number of states eligible to hold an early primary or caucus. Compression could be diminished due to the finite number of states that could hold their event within certain time periods.
The plan could also lengthen the period of time for the primary contest. Instead of the nomination being effectively wrapped up by early March, it could be extended through the spring and into early summer. Sustained voter participation and media interest would surely follow. Such an extended primary season would allow for increased discussion of the issues and vetting of the candidates.
Early “retail politics” could be enhanced by the graduated nature of the plan, giving opportunity for lesser-known (and less funded) candidates to gain traction in the primary process. (Brock 2000, 27-28)
The first pod encompasses 17 states and territories, and although the populations of these jurisdictions are small, the net effect is that of forcing candidates to wage semi-national campaigns. As New Hampshire Senator Bob Smith put it in June 2000, “The idea that a single grass roots candidate can appeal to 14.9 million people who are spread over the entire continental United States from Maine to Alaska, plus five different island regions, is not realistic.” (Smith 2000) The Center for Governmental Studies concluded that the Delaware Plan might create four mini-national campaigns:
Each grouping of states is spread out across the country, making it very difficult to have a concentrated effort anywhere. This plan would likely increase the wear and tear on candidates or the media. Moreover, having more than one or two small states at the beginning of the schedule would force candidates to choose among the group for more viable markets and opt to disregard others. Thus, candidates would probably end up saturating the other states with television ads and direct mailings to compensate for the lack of personal appearances. It is already very expensive waging a media campaign in the two major media markets reaching New Hampshire--Manchester and Boston. Imagine doing so in all of the states in the first pod. (Center for Governmental Studies 2001, 20)
Another criticism of the Delaware Plan is that states are locked into the same schedule in every quadrennial cycle. The larger the state, the later it is always scheduled. This is inherently unfair to voters in large states. At the Republican National Convention in July 2000, Bush advisor and former RNC Chairman Haley Barbour said that the Delaware Plan is a “sincere” but “impractical” effort to fix the system. Barbour objected to a system that would allow a candidate to lock up the nomination before being tested in a big state like New York, Pennsylvania, California, Texas, or Florida. (Walsh 2000) It was believed that such a schedule might “permanently disenfranchise half the nation’s voters, who are concentrated in the largest dozen states, [because] nominations would still be settled in the early primaries.” (Broder 2000) Other criticisms hurled at the plan included:
[T]he states at the end of the calendar would never have a chance to influence the process. (Clymer 2000)
The 12 largest states should not allow their voters to have their voices stifled. (Smith 2000a)
We’re not excited about a plan that discriminates against the people of California because they happen to live in a large state. (Schneider 2000)
While proponents of the Delaware Plan contend that it preserves “the ‘retail’ side of politics, keeping candidates down on the ground talking to people where they live and work, not just up on the airwaves through expensive television ads,” (Walsh 2000) the Graduated Random System far better achieves this goal. The current algorithm typically selects two small states or one larger state (a total of eight congressional districts) for the first interval. In contrast, the Delaware Plan’s first pod consists of 12 states with a total of 17 congressional districts, plus American Samoa, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
At the same time, the Graduated Random System is much fairer to large states than the Delaware Plan. For example, in the Delaware Plan, Virginia, being the 12th most populous state, would always vote on the first Tuesday in June (the last pod), when 40% of the country had already voted; however, in the Graduated Random System, Virginia would be eligible to vote as early as the first Tuesday in March (the second of ten intervals), and only two percent of the country would have voted in the previous round. Table 14 compares the wide disparity in the treatment of states under the Delaware Plan as compared to the Graduated Random System. Under the Delaware Plan, the percentage of the total US population voting before a given state ranges from zero to 40. Under the baseline Graduated Random System, based on the average eligibility of states to vote in the ten intervals, the percentage of the total US population voting before a given state ranges from 30 to 59. Furthermore, in the Mod 2/2A Graduated Random System, in which California is eligible to vote in the fourth, sixth, eighth, and tenth intervals, the relative advantage of the smallest states over the largest states is 13 percent, only one-third the spread in the Delaware Plan. It is remarkable that this level of equitability is achieved in a system that deliberately gives preferential treatment to small states.