The Proportional Phasing into Winner-Take-All Allocation Model

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Also testifying at the Brock Commission’s Academic Forum were Professors Ronald Rapoport of the College of William and Mary and Walter Stone of the University of Colorado at Boulder:

In the first month of the presidential primary season, states would be required to allocate all of their delegates based strictly on the proportion of the presidential primary vote each candidate receives.

Any state holding its primary during the second month of the presidential primary season would be allowed to allocate one-third (1/3) of its delegates to the winner of the primary, with the remaining two-thirds (2/3) split proportionally based on the primary vote.

During the third month of the presidential primary season, two-thirds (2/3) of a state's delegates could be allocated to the winner of the primary, with the remaining one-third (1/3) split proportionally based on the primary vote.

Any state holding its primary anytime during or after the fourth month of the presidential primary season would be allowed to have a total winner-take-all system, where all of that state's delegates would be allocated to the winner of its primary. (Brock 2000, 32)

Advantages

As stated in the Brock Commission report:

Since the early delegates are split proportionally based on the primary vote between several presidential candidates, this system may extend the number of primaries before a presidential candidate would receive enough delegate votes to secure the nomination. This may encourage candidates other than the front-runner to remain in the contest for a longer period of time, since they could still be receiving some delegates.

This model suggests that states would have an incentive to hold their primaries later in the process so that more of their delegates would be awarded to one candidate under the winner-take-all method. (Brock 2000, 32)

Disadvantages

The underlying premise, that front-loading would be alleviated because states would prefer holding late, winner-take-all primaries over holding early, proportional-allocation primaries is unproven, and somewhat refuted by the historical record. California traditionally held a late, winner-take-all primary until 1996, when it moved its primary from June to March. It is true that this was a case of having one’s cake and eating it too, in that in moving its primary to March, California did not switch to a proportional-allocation system. However, given the choice between being early and being winner-take-all, California would probably prefer to be early, since even with a proportional-allocation primary, the state with one-eighth of the total population of the United States is easily large enough to have a great influence over presidential candidates. For the same reason, other populous states such as Texas, New York, and Florida would probably follow suit. Since these four states account for roughly one-third of the US population, they would attract the other states to the front of the primary season like an electromagnet.

Even if the premise of this system were valid, the logical consequence would be that states would overwhelmingly choose to hold late, winner-take-all primaries in order to maximize their influence over a single candidate. The result would be “back-loading,” the stacking up of most of the primaries at the end of the season. This would in no was be an improvement over front-loading, for in either case the lion’s share of the delegates would be selected within a week or two.

Worse still is the idea of encouraging winner-take-all primaries. The Brock Commission agreed:

During the 2000 presidential election cycle, nearly half the states have used some form of the winner-take-all system for allocating their delegates to the Republican presidential candidates.

Some have expressed concern that this has in fact contributed significantly to the short season in which there is an actual contest for the party's nomination. The criticism is that such a system forces presidential candidates out of the field before voters are able to truly focus on each candidate's ideas and message. Another argument against winner-take-all is that it does not provide a sufficient voice to voters who selected a candidate receiving a minority percentage of the vote.

The Advisory Commission feels there is merit in moving towards a fully proportional method of allocating delegates to the presidential candidates. A proportional system would serve to lengthen the actual election contest, and to provide many more voters with a voice in the process. (Brock 2000, 22)

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