The Rotating Regional Plan
The Rotating Regional Plan |
|
In February 1999 the NASS endorsed a system of rotating regional primaries Lester 1999). Its primary supporters are former Secretary of State Bill Jones (R-CA) and Secretary of the Commonwealth Bill Galvin (D-MA). Additionally, bills were introduced in the Senate by Slade Gorton (R-WA) and Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) in March 1996 and again in October 1999 (SB 1789). (Gorton and Lieberman 1999, Lieberman 1999, Gorton 2000) The Brock Commission recommended that the Rotating Regional Primary Plan be given consideration as an alternative reform in case the Delaware Plan was not adopted (Brock 2000, 30).
In this system, each region of the country would form a bloc, and the states within each bloc would hold their primaries on the same date. There would be four such blocs, with primaries occurring on the first Tuesday in March, April, May, and June. The date on which a specific region voted would rotate every four years, so that each region would have an equal opportunity to be first, last, or somewhere in the middle. Iowa and New Hampshire would be exempted from the Eastern bloc, however, and would be allowed to choose their delegates ahead of the first regional primary. (NASS 2000) Table 18 and Figure 34 show the proposed schedule for 2004. Figure 35 and Figure 36 are corresponding political and geographic maps.
This plan treats the regions equally, rotating their positions in the schedule from one quadrennial cycle to the next. As stated in the Brock Commission report:
Unlike the current system in which many of the same states vote early every election, the rotating regional system would allow a different region to go first every four years. Each region would be eligible to vote in the opening month of the nominating schedule once every fourth presidential election. Since each state would be eligible to vote during the initial month only once every four elections and would be required to rotate to later in the process, no state under this plan would repeatedly hold a preeminent position in the nominating process. (Brock 2000, 29)
A clear advantage of any regional primary scheme is that, all other things being equal, campaign costs would be reduced:
Because many media markets serve more than one state, the cost of campaigning in a region could be less than the total cost of campaigning in each state individually. Also, states that are geographically close would have their primaries or caucuses during the same time period, thereby potentially reducing the cost of transportation for candidates and their staff. (Brock 2000, 29)
The Rotating Regional Plan maintains the historic prerogatives enjoyed by Iowa and New Hampshire for those who cherish this.
Finally, the Brock Commission report noted:
NASS points out that the rotating regional system builds upon a general movement towards regional primaries. Some regional states have coalesced to hold their primaries on the same day. In 1988, several southern states joined together to form Super Tuesday on the second Tuesday of March. Eleven states that would be in the southern region under the rotating regional plan participated in Super Tuesday in 1988, and six of those southern states held their primary on the second Tuesday in March of 2000. Seven of the states, which would be in the East region, had primaries on the same day in 2000, the first Tuesday in March. Also in 2000, there was an attempt by a few of the western states to create a Rocky Mountain primary on March 10. Three of those states, all of which would be in the West region under the NASS proposal, held their primary or caucus on the same date in 2000. (Brock 2000, 28)
The NASS’s appeal to the historical trend toward regional primaries as a justification for its preferred plan is curious, for it is exactly this trend that has resulted in the front-loading of the process. Pointing out the advent of regional primaries ignores the overall and dominant trend, which is that nearly all of the primaries now occur within a one-week period. In this context, the concept of regional primaries is essentially meaningless.
Even a rotating regional primary system divided into four segments spread out over several months would blow out candidates with small campaign chests in the first round, because such candidates could not possibly compete in so many states simultaneously. Indeed, one can predict that such a system would result in fewer candidates even daring to throw their hats into the ring, thereby giving the people fewer choices.
Another criticism, raised by the Center for Governmental Studies, is that the Rotating Regional Plan does not address the practice of “homesteading,” in which candidates campaign in Iowa and New Hampshire years in advance in order to build a local political network:
This plan fails to break up the Iowa-New Hampshire monopoly. As a result, these two states will continue to set the tone for the entire race, and the candidates will continue to camp out in these states, preserving the permanent campaign. Homesteading may actually become more prevalent under such a plan. Because campaigns will know decades in advance which region will go first in any given election year, they may choose to spend even more time pandering to voters in an entire region. This predictability will likely dictate the timing of presidential bids by certain candidates, as they await a year in which the regional order benefits them. It may actually extend homesteading over several election cycles, rather than just years. (Center for Governmental Studies 2001, 21)
Rotating regional primaries would give unfair advantage to a candidate from the region that holds its primary first. The Brock Commission noted the concern that “the rotating regional concept encourages a ‘favorite son’ candidate from the first region who could likely win the primaries and caucuses in that region, and as a result go into the next region with a significant advantage in the race for delegates.” (Brock 2000, 29) The concern is a legitimate one. Since the South’s Super Tuesday was initiated in 1988, six of the eight major party presidential nominees have been from southern states (see Table 19).
Another criticism found in the Brock Commission’s report:
[S]ome believe there would be a disparity between the states within different regions under this plan. The claim is that presidential candidates would ignore the smaller states in each region, and instead concentrate on larger states with more delegates. Supporters of this model, on the other hand, say that candidates who are less well-known or less well-financed could concentrate on the smaller states within a region to establish momentum. (Brock 2000, 29)
One has to ask, “What momentum?” What would be the point of focusing on small states to pick up a small number of delegates, while other candidates walked away with the big prizes in the large-population states?
Compared to the Rotating Regional Plan, the Graduated Random System allows a much more gradual ramp-up in the extent and expense of campaigning. Grass roots campaigns with shoestring budgets would be competitive through several election intervals, giving them time to gather momentum. This opens the process to the widest field of candidates, giving the American voter more choices and a longer time to deliberate.
The Rotating Regional Primary Plan gives an overwhelming advantage to one particular region in a given presidential year. On the other hand, the Graduated Random System picks individual states at random rather than whole regions, bringing more regional balance to the system.