Why Iowa and New Hampshire?

One defect of the traditional presidential primary schedule was that the states voted in much the same order from one quadrennial cycle to the next. Traditionally, Iowa held the first caucuses and New Hampshire held the first primary. One of the rationales for Iowa and New Hampshire always going first, aside from historical precedent, is that being such small states, relatively obscure candidates running shoe-string campaigns can get out their messages almost as effectively as the well-known and well-heeled “front-runners”. In Iowa and New Hampshire, where candidates can literally campaign door-to-door, everyone has a fighting chance. It is probably as close to a level playing field as American politics ever gets.

A level playing field, yes… but it is analogous to a football game in which the opposing teams do not switch goals every quarter. The percentages of African Americans in Iowa and New Hampshire, 2.1 and 0.7, respectively, fall far short of the national average (12.3 percent). In fact, every race enumerated by the U.S. Census is significantly underrepresented in these two states (see Table 1). The percentages of families below poverty (Iowa, 6.0 percent; New Hampshire, 4.3 percent) also fall significantly short of the national average (9.2 percent). (U.S. Census Bureau 2002) Since the demographics of Iowa and New Hampshire are not particularly representative of the entire nation, some candidates play these first primary games with the wind at their back, while others have the wind in their face. It is also inherently unfair to the voters of other states to always have to wait for Iowa and New Hampshire to go first.

In proposing his plan for primary reform, Senator Robert Smith (R-NH) raised a number of points in favor of his state’s privileged status:

From the candidate’s perspective, I would attest that the most important reason is the historical certainty it offers for candidates. Parties in states like Louisiana or Alaska or Delaware will pop up now and then and threaten to conduct a caucus or primary before New Hampshire and Iowa. This distracts and confuses the campaigns and the result is wasted effort by candidates and ultimately a disorganized poorly-planned caucus or primary that offers little to the Party. (Smith 2000)

Perhaps a candidate who is easily distracted and confused by having to campaign in states other than New Hampshire and Iowa ought not to be the next leader of the Free World. The job of the president is to lead this nation into the future, which is by definition uncertain. An inflexible primary system rooted in “historical certainty” does little to illuminate a candidate’s ability in this regard. Looking at this issue another way, no professional sports team plays the same schedule year after year. Shouldn’t the next president of the United States be at least as competent as a football coach?

Senator Smith pointed to four advantages of the current position of Iowa and New Hampshire. First of all:

Historically, they are first. Campaigns understand this and, as early as possible, can begin assembling a grass roots organization and scheduling candidate tours. Without that clarity, the candidates will be forced to waste lots of energy and time in states that may or may not go early. (Smith 2000)

Essentially, this is an argument in favor of homesteading, the practice of campaigning in certain states for years prior to the election. Candidates spend years building organizations and appealing to tiny constituencies that are unrepresentative of the nation as a whole. As Senator Robert Packwood (R-OR) said of this practice, “Given enough time, any candidate with 10,000 zealots can win a state. Garibaldi took Italy with 10,000 redshirts. You shouldn’t confuse that with mass appeal.” (Congressional Quarterly 1972)

Next, Senator Smith contended:

The Media understand Iowa and New Hampshire. They understand the processes and they are ready for them. They are fully prepared to cover televised debates, and they normally have substantial on-the-ground coverage to ensure that the local activities are televised on a national scale. The media have the ability to gauge the support candidates are receiving at the local level, allowing a lesser known candidate to gain momentum by having his local success broadcasted to a national audience. (Smith 2000)

The media are fully prepared to go anywhere any time news is being made. As I write this, there are probably more representatives of the national and international media in Nacogdoches than in my hometown of San Francisco. The media have the ability to develop a working knowledge of the issues quiet rapidly and report them to the public, anything from hanging chads to de-bonded shuttle tiles.

Senator Smith’s third point was that:

The two parties have traditionally supported Iowa and New Hampshire’s early status. The Democrats are committed to keeping them first. While, of course, it is our prerogative as Republicans to choose whatever primary dates we want, it is useful to maintain the kind of media focus as well as voter participation if both parties have their early primaries on the same date. (Smith 2000)

Since the Democratic Party has now apparently abandoned its commitment to keeping Iowa and New Hampshire first, this is no longer a valid argument, if it ever was one.

Next, Senator Smith asserted:

The states of Iowa and New Hampshire are fully committed to the early dates. In fact, New Hampshire’s state law requires it to be first. State sponsorship provides an organized, professionally-conducted, adequately funded primary, as well as a more unbiased vote count. This is essential in the early primaries because it lends credibility to the result in the eyes of the media and the national public. (Smith 2000)

The argument that New Hampshire’s state law requires it to be first is the intellectual equivalent of, “Because I said so.” As a matter of Constitutional principle, the laws of one state cannot pre-empt those of another. California has a much right to legislate that it’s presidential primary be first, for instance. Furthermore, states other than New Hampshire are capable of organized and professionally-conducted elections. In particular, one may look to Florida to be a paragon of professionalism in the next presidential election cycle.

Senator Smith concluded his argument in favor of the current privilege of his state with a tribute to his fellow citizens:

What other state parties ignore is that with this privilege comes a unique responsibility and a unique burden. New Hampshire citizens are fully aware of their responsibilities in the area of picking presidential nominees. They take this responsibility seriously.... We have survived and refined this process over the past several decades, and I believe we provide America with an extraordinary service in reviewing and assessing the candidates without interference by big money and slick media campaigns. (Smith 2000)

While this is all very nice for the people of these two states, it hardly seems appropriate to defend the current privileged position of Iowa and New Hampshire as an exclusive civics lesson for their populations. The citizens of other small states should be given the opportunity to sit in the front row of the classroom of democracy. Should the citizens of the nation’s capital, for instance, be any less expert practitioners of the democratic process than the citizens of New Hampshire?

Political scientists Lisa K. Parshall and Franco Mattei, in constructing their constitutional argument against the current system based on the First and Fourteenth Amendments (see the “Supreme Court Challenge” section), observe:

Nor can the early states assert that long-standing first-in-the-nation status has created a tradition or political culture of informed participation which gives entitlement to their voters. The mere fact that a handful of states have enjoyed the privilege of hosting the first nominating contests of the election year is not sufficient justification for diluting the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of late-state voters. “Historic accident, without more, cannot constitute a compelling state interest. (Illinois vs. Socialist Workers Party 1979)” An argument that the first states play a special role in the winnowing process, have a more informed electorate, or just plain “do it better” than other states is based on circular logic, is debatable, and utterly lacking in constitutional foundation (Parshall and Mattei 2002, 25-26).

Parshall and Mattei also present a compelling argument against the “first in the nation” privilege of Iowa and New Hampshire on the basis of Congress’ authority to regulate interstate commerce (Article I, Section 8, Clause 3).

Nor may a state seek to extend the effect of its laws beyond its own borders or in a manner which destroys or impairs the rights of citizens in other states. To ensure the protection of national interests, commerce principles therefore authorize federal regulation of in-state activities where such activities have an impact outside the state (Parshall and Mattei 2002, 27).

A commerce analogy is appropriate for two reasons. First... among the benefits that states gain in securing a date early in the presidential nomination process are the economic rewards generated by the campaigns and the national media attention which the first contests receive. “Candidates do more than just visit Iowa and New Hampshire. They also rent office space, hotel rooms and cars, eat at local restaurants and buy millions of dollars of advertising (Stark 1996).” Hosting the nation’s first primaries thus provides first status states with a “cyclical economic boom (Udall 1981).” In the commerce jurisprudence, state laws which similarly “hoard” interstate resources or enact protective legislation designed to economically advantage in-state interest at the expense of out-of-state citizens, are forbidden. The Constitution would seem no less offended when the fundamental freedoms of association and voting are at stake (Parshall and Mattei 2002, 27-28).

Second, commerce clause jurisprudence is founded upon the recognition of larger national interests which reject interstate competition. The same argument may be made regarding frontloading. If one state seeks to advantage its voters relative to the voters of other states in choosing nominees for a national office, it opens the door to reciprocal efforts. Indeed, front-loading is the outcome of this very kind of interstate competition which the Court forbids under the Commerce Clause. In the electoral context it also makes structural sense to ensure that national interests are protected from encroachment by states acting with the complicity of the national parties. Just as state action may “retard, impede, or frustrate” national interests in the regulation of commerce, the front-loading of primaries and caucuses “places a significant state-imposed restriction on a nationwide electoral process (Anderson vs. Celebrezze 1983; Parshall and Mattei 2002, 28).”

Many unjust practices, such as slavery and the denial of female suffrage, have had the weight of tradition and yet have eventually fallen before the expanding American experiment in liberty and self-government. In time, the honored tradition of privileging the voters Iowa and New Hampshire over other Americans will have a place in history similar to the honored traditions that once privileged white males over other Americans, as another injustice that the American system eventually corrected.